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I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in technology have given new life to debates con-
cerning privacy.' Specifically, issues surrounding increased access
to personal medical records have recently garnered attention. On
one side of the debate, healthcare providers and insurers support
1. See, e.g., Sandra Byrd Petersen, Your Life as An Open Book: Has Technology Ren-
dered Personal Privacy Virtually Obsolete?, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 163 (1995).
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expanded access to medical records for treatment, research, and
insurance claims purposes. At the same time, however, many pa-
tients legitimately expect their medical records to remain private.
The advent of Internet access to patient records and electronic
medical insurance claims submissions has heightened patients' con-
cerns that computerized medical records will offer less protection
and more potential for unauthorized disclosure than paper files in
locked cabinets. 2 This has prompted commentators to argue that, as
medical information becomes increasingly accessible via means out-
side a patient's control, the need for privacy protection grows even
stronger.3 Though threats to privacy exist in all media of informa-
tion, electronically stored information lies particularly vulnerable
to abuse and thus requires heightened protection. 4
For example, one former employee of a state health plan dis-
covered during a computer training class that he could access rec-
ords of several insurance subscribers. 5 When he typed in his own
name, he was startled to see his private psychiatric records, in-
cluding the name of the antidepressant medication he was taking.6
Similarly, one woman who had purchased a used computer found
2,000 patient records from a pharmacy that had simply been left
stored on the computer's hard drive.7 These records contained the
names, addresses, Social Security numbers, and lists of every medi-
cation prescribed for customers of the pharmacy, including pre-
scriptions for AIDS and psychiatric conditions.8 A third illustration
shows the unique dangers of electronic websites: one chief executive
officer of a loan company that allows customers to apply for credit
cards and loans on-line initiated a strict privacy policy.9 Though he
took several steps to safeguard customer privacy-including bar-
2. See Patricia I. Carter, Health Information Privacy: Can Congress Protect Confidential
Medical Information in the "Information Age"?, 25 WM. MTCHELL L. REV. 223, 226-27 (1999).
3. See CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 100-03 (1999); Roger E. Harris, The Need
to Know Versus the Right to Know: Privacy of Patient Medical Data in an Information.Based
Society, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (1997) (footnote omitted).
4. See id. One commentator stated the problem in stark terms: "New technology dra-
matically expands the potential for abuse. 'Data is like a prostitute,' says one advocate for the
mentally ill. 'Once ies on the street, everybody has access to it.'" SYKES, supra note 3, at 101.
5. See SYKES, supra note 3, at 101.
6. See id. After this experience, the trainee stated, "I can tell you unequivocally that pa-
tient confidentiality is not eroding-it can't erode, because itWs simply nonexistent." Id.
7. See id.
8. See id. Upon further investigation, the woman learned that as many as thirty-four
other computers had been sold carrying similar medical information. See id.
9. See Michael Moss, A Web CEO's Elusive Goal: Privacy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2000, at
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ring his technicians from using "cookies,"l°0-the CEO was stunned
to learn that parts of his Web site did in fact employ cookies." The
cookies were placed on the site as a result of the company's acquisi-
tions and mergers with other Internet lenders who allowed the use
of cookies on their websites, even though the company had paid
$250,000 for a privacy audit conducted by an outside firm. 12
The effects of the increasingly unauthorized disclosure of pri-
vate medical information are evident in both individual behavior
and in the quality of health care that patients receive. For example,
a recent poll found that one in six United States adults "had at
some time done something unusual to conceal medical information,
such as paying cash for services."'u One commentator noted that
some patients may even stop treatment when they begin to suspect
that their privacy is not being respected. 14 In addition, numerous
psychologists admit to avoiding discussions of sensitive material
that could prove damaging if such information ended up on insur-
ance company databases. 15 In contrast, one Baltimore psychiatrist
told the Washington Post that economic incentives encourage doc-
tors to probe into deeply sensitive areas because the more specific a
record is, the more insurance approvals the therapist will receive. 16
Either way, these examples show how privacy problems create in-
centives for doctors and patients to engage in behavior that can of-
ten thwart the common goal of effective health care. 17
Given the potential consequences, it is not surprising that
people take extraordinary measures to protect the privacy of their
10. Id. Cookies are computer codes that track visitors to Internet sites. See id. Using
cookies allows information that a customer has stored on a computer hard-drive or entered at
a website to be transmitted to other sites without the customer's awareness. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. When the CEO asked the other lenders to remove cookies from their shared
sites, he learned that this was impossible since the other lenders had pacts with other part-
ners to use cookies. These pacts allowed the partners to receive a bounty every time they
referred someone to their sites. See id.
13. SYKES, supra note 3, at 101. Paying cash for services ensures that there is no way the
services will be traceable through financial means, such as credit card or bank statements.
14. See id. at 105 ('Many [doctors] can recount stories of patients who have dropped out
of treatment when they were told their confidences might not be respected. Other patients
have walked out when told that their therapist would have to label them with a mental disor-
der to justify continued coverage with the insurance company.").
15. See id. at 105 ("Some therapists confess that they have found themselves almost un-
consciously steering away from information in their sessions that might prove to be damaging
if it made its way into the computerized databases of insurance companies.").
16. See id. (citing Arthur Allen, Exposed: Computer Technology, Managed Care Are All
Undermining the American Tradition of Medical Privacy, In the Name of Progress, WASH.
POST, Feb. 8, 1998).
17. See supra notes 14-15.
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medical records. Indeed, unauthorized disclosure can result in a
patient being denied insurance, deciding to forego insurance, get-
ting fired, or being stigmatized.'8 In one instance, an employer dis-
covered that an employee had AIDS from a pharmacy's computer
printout that mistakenly included patient names. 19
The potential for unwarranted release of personal medical in-
formation due to the increased popularity of electronic storage da-
tabases has spawned a debate over the types of remedies that will
best protect individual privacy.20 There are several potential tools
for balancing a patient's privacy concerns with the interests of
other parties in accessing medical information.2 1 These include
state law, federal law, self-regulation, 22 and explicit federal consti-
tutional protection.23
18. Privacy experts have articulated three types of harms that can result from privacy
violations within the realm of medical information. See Harris, supra note 3, at 1196-97 (foot-
note omitted). First are "intrinsically moral violations" that violate an individual's interest in
protecting personal information from disclosure. See id. Second are consequential harms,
which have effects beyond the individual level and "elicit responses from society as a whole."
Id. These releases often result in social stigmas that attach to a person as a result of disclo-
sures of information regarding sensitive social issues such as HIV/AIDS or psychiatric coun-
seling. See id. The third type of harm is financial. See id. An example of a financial harm
would be a scenario where an employee loses her job or a cancer-patient is denied a loan be-
cause of a non-consensual release of private medical information. See id.
19. See Doe v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth. C'SEPTA"), 72 F.3d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir.
1995). The Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") did not fire Doe
as a result of his illness; rather, Doe brought his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that
the company violated his right to privacy. See id. at 1134-35; see also infra notes 83-91 and
accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 3, at 1191. Medical records are particularly difficult to
regulate because they have various uses. This variety means that lawmakers attempt to write
healthcare laws to protect groups with different interests, such as patients and insurance
providers. The resulting law is often an attempt to strike a middle ground that pleases nei-
ther group. Additional uses can include patient care, communication between doctors, docu-
menting care for insurance purposes, research, complying with a legal duty, obtaining pay-
ment and defending a health care provider in a malpractice suit. See id.
21. State intrusion into personal information creates different problems and must be
regulated differently than intrusion by private third parties. This distinction is discussed
more extensively below. See infra Part III.B.
22. Self-regulation is a term that is used in a variety of ways. In the context of this Note,
it refers to regulation that exists because of the initiative of the entity that would otherwise be
regulated by the government at some level. For a general discussion and list of reference
materials discussing the various uses of and debates concerning the term "self-regulation," see
Matthew J. McCloskey, Bibliography of Internet Self Regulation, Internet Law and Policy
Forum (visited Feb. 23, 2000) <http://flpf.org/selfreg/bib4_15.htm>. There are a wide range of
self-regulatory tools, including codes of conduct, voluntary standards, accreditation, third-
party certification and audits. See id. at <http://flpforg/selfreg/announce.htm>.
23. See, e.g., Carter, supra note 2, at 241; see also Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Law
Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 193, 195 (Philip E. Agre & Marc
Rotenberg eds., 1997). Gellman points out that American privacy law is fragmented, while
privacy law in Europe is usually governed by omnibus rules that apply generally to both pub-
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To help preserve an individual's right to privacy, a number of
states have enacted comprehensive schemes to regulate the dis-
semination of private medical information within their
boundaries. 24 Many state constitutions, for example, include consti-
tutional amendments designed to protect private information. 25 In
addition, common law remedies remain available for invasions of
privacy.26 Still further, several states have enacted legislative
schemes designed to protect a resident's private medical informa-
tion.27 Moreover, many of the techniques that states use to create
privacy protections mirror those used at the federal level and have
similar defects.28
In addition to the actions taken by the individual states, the
federal government has proposed-but not passed-privacy protec-
tion legislation.29 The 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act ("HIPAA") gave Congress until August 21, 1999 to
pass legislation pertaining to medical records privacy, but Congress
failed to meet this deadline. 30 As a result, the burden of proposing
appropriate privacy regulations fell on the Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") and President Clinton.3' On October
lic and private records. The American approach is "sectoral," meaning that instead of imple-
menting laws to protect privacy in general, such laws cover specific records or recordkeepers.
The effect of this approach is what is often described as a patchwork quilt of privacy law,
spread among constitutional protections, common law remedies and statutory protections.
24. See Carter, supra note 2, at 246-51 (summarizing the various techniques states use to
protect privacy).
25. See id. at 246 (citing to the constitutions of Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington).
26. See id. at 247 (discussing state law claims for breach of fiduciary duty of confidential-
ity, invasion of right to privacy, and breach of implied contract).
27. See id. at 254-66 (using as examples state legislation in California, Tennessee, and
Minnesota).
28. See generally id. (surveying the problems inherent with state as well as, federal pri-
vacy protections).
29. See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, White House Seeks Compromise on Access to Health In-
formation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1999, at A4 ("On Capital Hill, lawmakers' many attempts to
forge privacy legislation have sputtered.").
30. See Mary Jane Fisher, Senate Stymied on Medical Privacy Legislation, NATL.
UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK AND BEN. MGMT. June 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL
8859623. There are three main reasons cited for the failure of the bill's passage: First was a
party conflict over whether a minor's medical records would trigger notification to parents of
pregnancy or AIDS. Second was whether there could be a "right to sue" for violations of medi-
cal confidentiality law. Third was whether a federal privacy law should preempt state laws.
See id.
31. See Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in sections of 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (also
referred to as the Kennedy Kassenbaum Act)). The terms of HIPAA dictated that, should
Congress fail to act by its self-imposed deadline, the burden of regulating medical records
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29, 1999, President Clinton proposed several regulations scheduled
for implementation in February 2002.32 These regulations would
require drug companies and other entities to gain approval from a
review board before being allowed access to individually identifiable
patient information without patient consent.33 The regulation al-
lows HHS to restrict the conduct of health plans and providers, but
it precludes the department from regulating those who might re-
ceive private medical records, such as pharmaceutical companies or
other contractors.3 4
In addition to the legislative approach, federal constitutional
protection of privacy interests remains a possibility, although prior
case law fails to provide an absolute endorsement of individual pri-
vacy rights. In the 1977 decision of Whalen v. Roe, the United
States Supreme Court upheld a New York law requiring doctors to
report to the state all prescriptions written for certain dangerous or
narcotic drugs. 35 The Court held that this requirement did not un-
constitutionally invade the patients' privacy interests, and the ma-
jority decision declined to explicitly establish a constitutional right
to privacy in one's medical records.3 6
In light of the fact that technological advances are making
private medical information more easily available, the Court's re-
luctance to articulate a clear privacy standard troubled Justice
Brennan, who noted in his concurring opinion that
[t]he central storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase
the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that fu-
ture developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such tech-
nology.37
privacy would fall to the Department of Health and Human Services and President Clinton.
See id.
32. See Lisa M. Bowman, Clinton Privacy Plan: Only a First Step, ZD New News from ZD
Wire, (Oct. 29, 1999), available in 1999 WL 14538191.
33. See HHS Privacy Reg Seeks to Protect Subjects in Privately-Funded Studies, HEALTH
NEWS DAILY, Nov. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10485071.
34. See id.
35. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977) (holding that the New York law evidenced a
proper concern for the privacy interests of the individuals involved).
36. See id. Although there is no "general constitutional right to privacy," the Supreme
Court has found privacy protection to emanate from the Constitution in specific instances.
See, e.g., Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (finding that a right to privacy emanates from
the Fourth Amendment); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (finding that a
right to privacy emanates from the penumbra of the First Amendment).
37. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 607. For example, early in 1999, a major medical center inadver-
tently stored several thousand patient records on a public Internet site for two months. See
President Clinton Takes New Steps to Protect the Privacy of Personal Health Information, M2
Presswire, Nov. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 24365493. Similarly, during a speech to unveil
1610 [Vol. 53:5:1605
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Since 1977, technology has indeed increased the accessibility
of medical records via electronic media. Meanwhile, technology also
has diminished the effectiveness of existing methods, such as locked
cabinets, file rooms and security personnel, of protecting secret in-
formation from falling into the wrong hands.38
Without clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuits
have split on the issue of whether the Constitution protects the pri-
vacy of one's medical records from unauthorized intrusion. The
Sixth Circuit has found that no such right exists, 3 9 and the Third
Circuit has vehemently disagreed.40 In light of the Court's past de-
cisions pertaining to the constitutional right of privacy, the Court
should revisit this issue because of the drastic changes in access to
medical information since the Whalen v. Roe decision.41
Along with legislation and constitutional protection, self-
regulation is a potential solution that has received increasing at-
tention due to the increased popularity of the Internet. Although
any self-regulatory model would require outside regulatory meas-
ures and incentives to succeed, such a model may provide the best
his proposed privacy-protection plan, President Clinton noted a survey "showing that one-
third of all Fortune 500 companies check medical records before they hire or promote people."
Bowman, supra note 32. Another example concerns a mother who submitted bone marrow
cells to a bank in order to be screened to determine whether she matched the marrow of her
young daughter who was suffering from a bone marrow disease. There was no match, and the
girl died, but the woman's results from the screening ended up in a computerized database,
subjecting the mother to hundreds of phone requests for her bone marrow. See Leah Curtin &
Roy Simpson, Privacy in the Information Age?, HEALTHY MGMT. TECH. 32, Aug. 1, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 13225148. Other instances include a Florida healthcare worker who leaked a
confidential list of AIDS patients to newspapers, a medical student who sold medical records
to malpractice lawyers, Medicaid clerks who sold computer printouts of patient financial rec-
ords to managed care companies, and a convicted rapist who stole someone else's password to
browse over 1000 patient files in order to obtain telephone numbers and private information
before making obscene telephone calls. See id.
38. In September 1999, computer hackers circulated a phone number that allowed anyone
to access a database of private medical records stored at St. Joseph Mercy Hospital in Pontiac,
Michigan. The hospital had been using a digital system that let doctors dictate medical rec-
ords. See Bowman, supra note 32.
39. See Jarvis v. Wellman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995) ('Disclosure of plaintiffs
medical records does not rise to the level of a breach of a right recognized as 'fundamental'
under the Constitution.").
40. See Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d 1133, 1138 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that employee medical
records deserve a measure of constitutional protection); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1980). Although the Third Circuit found such a constitu-
tional protection to exist, it refused to find that the plaintiffs constitutional right was vio-
lated, thus weakening the practical impact and arguably the precedential value of such a
right. See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 576.
41. See Petersen, supra note 1, at 172. C(Despite Justice Brennan's explicit recognition
that changing technology may necessitate a reexamination of this issue by the Court, this
issue has not resurfaced for reconsideration.").
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method of protecting electronically stored health information and
medical records. 42
This Note argues that a comprehensive model of self-
regulation, supplemented by market incentives and the threat of
strong federal legislation to supplant failed self-regulation, consti-
tutes the most practical and effective means of protecting medical
records stored in electronic formats. Part II of this Note examines
the historical and legal background of the medical records privacy
issue, focusing on the difficulties encountered by courts attempting
to resolve the issue under the Constitution. Part III then surveys
current state legislation and the pending federal and administra-
tive solutions and offers an argument for why these solutions are by
themselves insufficient. Part IV examines the debate over self-
regulation of Internet privacy and considers examples of successful
self-regulation in other industries. This Note concludes by advo-
cating more comprehensive attempts at self-regulation of electroni-
cally stored medical records, along with continued congressional
attempts to pass satisfactory federal legislation to supplement self-
regulation.
II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT AND THE CURRENT STATUS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR PATIENT
MEDICAL RECORDS
Existing privacy protections are ill-equipped to confront the
privacy problems created by technology. Older models such as the
Hippocratic Oath43 leave discretion entirely in the hands of the
physician, while constitutional protections lack the capacity to pro-
tect privacy invasions from private actors seeking personal infor-
mation.
A. The Hippocratic Oath
The earliest assertions of the need to protect private medical
information gave physicians the exclusive power to protect patient
privacy. For example, the Hippocratic Oath reads as follows:
42. See infra Part IV.
43. The Hippocratic Oath is "an oath embodying a code of medical ethics taken by those
about to begin medical practice." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 542 (1974). Ac-
cording to one author, "[h]is oath suggests that privacy of a patient's medical information
creates the foundation upon which a patient reposes trust in his or her physician." Harris,
supra note 3, at 1183.
[Vol. 53:5:16051612
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[w]hatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not in connection with
it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will
not divulge, as reckoning all that should be kept secret."
This rule, while still extant within the medical profession, be-
comes less applicable in the current context of the technologically
advanced health care industry and its rules and regulations, be-
cause total responsibility for a patient's well-being rarely rests in
the hands of a single doctor.45
B. The History of a Constitutional Right to Privacy and
Whalen v. Roe
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis introduced the
concept of an individual right to privacy.46 Beyond a mere property
right, the right to privacy protects the underlying intellectual ex-
pectation of privacy that arises from the secure ability to prevent
public disclosure of personal information.47 Foreshadowing many of
the current issues accompanying the increased availability of elec-
tronically stored personal medical information, Warren and Bran-
deis noted that technological advances like cameras and high speed
newspaper printing presses had "invaded the precincts of private
and domestic life."48 In this sense, Warren and Brandeis viewed
privacy as a means to preserve personal dignity.49
Almost seventy years later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,50 the
Supreme Court for the first time implied a constitutional right of
44. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIA MEDICAL DICTIONARY 769 (15th ed. 1985) (quoting the Hippo-
cratic Oath).
45. See SYKES, supra note 3, at 102 (quoting a managed care executive as saying that
"Hippocrates is 2,000 years old .... Medicine isn't one-on-one anymore. It's a team effort.").
Sykes notes that those who might have access to medical information include "HMO's, insur-
ance companies, private and public databases, pharmacists, hospital workers, and employers."
Id. In the managed care situation, that list might be expanded to include state health organi-
zations, researchers and marketing firms. See id.
46. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 197-99 & n.1 (1890) (arguing that a general right to privacy affords a remedy for mental
pain).
47. See id. at 201-205 ("Mhe protection afforded to thoughts, sentiments, and emotions..
- is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right to be let alone.").
48. Id. at 195.
49. See id.
50. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Director of Planned
Parenthood of Connecticut and a Connecticut physician were convicted of violating a Con-
necticut law prohibiting the use or dissemination of any birth control device. Id. at 480. The
Supreme Court held that the law unconstitutionally intruded on the right of marital privacy
found in the "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Id. at
485.
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privacy independent of the Fourth Amendment. 51 Griswold signaled
an analytical shift from the rights-based approach utilized in prior
Fourth Amendment cases toward a broader interpretation of consti-
tutional interests.5 2 The Court balanced a patient's personal inter-
ests in protecting against unwarranted intrusion into private areas
with the government's interest in accessing such areas. 53 Commen-
tators have argued that as a result of this shift in reasoning, "the
clear trend has been the expansion of privacy rights."54 Though the
Court in Griswold issued four separate opinions in defense of its
judgment, the reasoning of each of the opinions demonstrated the
existence of a privacy right distinct from the Fourth Amendment. 55
Subsequent decisions such as Loving v. Virginia,56 Stanley v. Geor-
gia,57 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,58 upheld and reinforced the privacy
rights of individuals. Each of these cases recognized a legitimate
constitutional privacy right by weighing that right against the gov-
51. See JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVAcY: LAW, ETHICS AND THE RISE OF
TECHNOLOGY 22 (1997) (noting that Griswold began the "trend [toward] the expansion of pri-
vacy rights").
52. The Fourth Amendment is a likely place to find constitutional protection of private
medical records. See John Godfrey, Forbes Hits 'Assault" on Medical Privacy, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1999, at A8. ("IThe Constitution's prohibitions against unreasonable searches and
seizures are adequate to protect against invasions of personal privacy by law enforcement.").
The Supreme Court, however, has found other constitutional protections independent of the
Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973) (finding that a state law
prohibiting abortion under any circumstance except to save the life of the mother was an un-
lawful invasion of an individual's constitutional, non-Fourth Amendment privacy rights);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438, 453 (1972) (using penumbral privacy rights to invalidate a
state law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried individuals); Griswold,
381 U.S. at 485 (holding that various constitutional "penumbral rights" exist to provide pri-
vacy protection and render a state law forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutional).
53. See supra note 51 (discussing the Courts shift toward "a utilitarian cost-benefit
analysis which balances the costs to privacy and the benefits to public safety").
54. Id. DeCew argues that the reasoning in Griswold was anticipated by similar constitu-
tional arguments protecting privacy in the case of Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50
S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). See id. at 23.
55. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 ("We have had many controversies over these penumbral
rights of 'privacy and repose.' [Past Supreme Court cases] bear witness that the right of pri-
vacy which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one. The present case, then, concerns a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees.") (citing Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S 1391 (1962); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1959);
Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622, 626, 644 (1951)).
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (striking down a Virginia statute outlawing
interracial marriage based on the Court's recognition of a penumbral privacy right).
57. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559 (1969) (citing a penumbral privacy right as an
important justification for allowing obscene materials in one's home).
58. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (citing a penumbral privacy right as the
rationale for allowing distribution of contraceptive devices).
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ernmental interests in limiting or intruding upon it.59 Finally, in
Roe v. Wade, the Court concluded that there are circumstances
where an individual's right to privacy outweighs the state's interest
in protecting a potential life. 60 Roe served as a strong statement in
support of a fundamental right to privacy and its relative weight
when compared to competing governmental interests.
Using Roe as a foundation, the Court in Whalen v. Roe issued
its most comprehensive definition of the privacy right, acknowl-
edging both an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters" and an "interest in independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions."6' Whalen is particularly relevant to
the issue of medical records privacy, because it involved the consti-
tutionality of a New York law mandating centralized computer rec-
ord keeping of prescriptions for certain drugs, complete with pa-
tient-identifiable information. 62 Although the Court upheld the
statute at issue,63 the reasoning employed by the Court is encour-
aging for three reasons. First, the Court recognized a more compre-
hensive privacy right, including an "interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters" that could encompass one's right to resist law
enforcement intrusion into personal medical information.64 Second,
the Court's balancing test focused on the potential harms caused by
the collection and maintenance of such information in medical da-
tabases; only after the Court was satisfied that the privacy risks
were sufficiently protected did it acknowledge the state's interest in
collecting such data.65 Finally, Justice Brennan's concurrence rec-
59. See id. at 453; see also Stanley, 394 U.S. at 567; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 162-63 (1973) (acknowledging a state interest in pro-
tecting potential life, but concluding that this interest does not completely outweigh the pri-
vacy right of the mother). The Court, however, has issued opinions on related issues that
resolve this balancing in favor of the governmental intrusion. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992) (finding that Pennsylvania's informed consent restrictions on
abortion rights did not impose an undue burden on the individual's constitutional privacy
rights); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989) (finding that a state's
interest in promulgating a law banning public employees from performing nontherapeutic
abortions in public facilities outweighed the individual's constitutional interest); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy).
61. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
62. Id. at 591 (addressing "whether the State of New York may record, in a centralized
computer file, the names and addresses of all persons who have obtained, pursuant to a doc-
tor's prescription, certain drugs for which there is both a lawful and unlawful market!').
63. See id. at 603-04 (finding that the potential privacy threats inherent in New York's
Controlled Substances Act did not rise to an unconstitutional "invasion of any [privacy] right
or liberty").
64. Id. at 599.
65. See id. at 593-94 (finding that protections such as locking the data tape in a storage
facility when not in use, running the data off-line, and providing access to only a limited num-
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ognized that state access to personal records was troublesome, and
that future technological developments might create a need to re-
visit the balancing process and to restrict the government's use of
technology that places privacy rights at risk.66
Despite the Whalen Court's cautionary language, 67 lower
courts have read the decision as severely limiting the right to in-
formational privacy, thereby shifting the balance toward govern-
mental interests.68 Whalen set the Court's deferential tone in con-
sidering the weight appropriately accorded to governmental activi-
ties when it observed that numerous state actions "require the or-
derly preservation of great quantities of information, much of which
is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
disclosed."69 According to one commentator, subsequent circuit
court cases indicate that deference to government interests has be-
her of officials were sufficient to ensure confidentiality); see also id. at 598 ("At the very least,
it would seem clear that the State's vital interest in controlling the distribution of dangerous
drugs would support a decision to experiment with new techniques for control.").
66. Justice Brennan observed:
What is more troubling about this scheme, however, is the central computer
storage of the data thus collected. Obviously, as the State argues, collection
and storage of data by the State that is in itself legitimate is not rendered un-
constitutional simply because new technology makes the State's operations
more efficient. However, as the example of the Fourth Amendment shows, the
Constitution puts limits not only on the type of information the State may
gather, but also on the means it may use to gather it. The central storage and
easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential for abuse
of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future developments will
not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology.
Id. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
67. The Whalen Court noted that:
The right to collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompa-
nied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclo-
sure. Recognizing that in some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots
in the Constitution, nevertheless New York's statutory scheme, and its imple-
menting administrative procedures, evidence of a proper concern with, and pro-
tection of, the individual's interest in privacy. We therefore need not, and do
not, decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclo-
.sure of accumulated private data whether intentional or unintentional or by a
system that did not contain comparable security provisions. We simply hold
that this record does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 605-06
68. See Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d 1133, 1139-40 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that an employer's
need to access prescription records outweighed the employee's privacy interest in a case in
which an employer discovered that an employee had AIDS based on the employee's drug pur-
chases via an employee health plan); United States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 580 (3d
Cir. 1980) (finding that the strong public interest in facilitating research and investigations of
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health justified the intrusion into privacy
surrounding employee medical records).
69. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
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come almost impossible to overcome. 70 As a result, the Court's in-
terpretation of the Constitution makes it likely that "almost any
police action intruding upon private medical records would cur-
rently survive such judicial review."71
C. Lower Court Precedent
Three years after the Whalen decision, the Third Circuit ex-
panded upon its tentative framework in United States v. Westing-
house.72 In Westinghouse, an employer appealed a district court de-
cision granting a motion to direct the employer to produce certain
documents in accordance with a subpoena duces tecum issued by
the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health ("NIOSH").73 The employer argued that requiring disclosure
of employee medical records would violate the privacy interests of
the employees. 74
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals noted that employee
medical records fall "well within the ambit of materials entitled to
[constitutional] privacy protection. ' 75 In order for a court to allow
"intrusion into the zone of privacy surrounding medical records, it
[must find] that the societal interest in disclosure outweighs the
70. See Peter H.W. van der Goes, Jr., Comment, Opportunity Lost: Why and How to Im-
prove the HHS-proposed Legislation Governing Law Enforcement Access to Medical Records,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1036 (1999) ("[W]hen courts employ a flexible balancing approach
and the government can assert some legitimate purpose, many privacy interests appear insuf-
ficient to overcome the courts' deference to the State.").
71. Id.
72. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 570.
73. See id. at 573. The purpose of the subpoena was to establish whether employees'
medical records would support the claim that the plant employees were exposed to a hazard-
ous substance known as hexahydrophthalic anhydride, or HHPA. See id. at 573.
74. See id. at 574.
75. See id. at 577. The Third Circuit explained:
Information about one's body and state of health is [a] matter which the indi-
vidual is ordinarily entitled to retain within the "private enclave where he may
lead a private life." It has been recognized in various contexts that medical re-
cords and information stand on a different plane than other relevant material.
For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose a higher burden for
discovery of reports of the physical and mental condition of a party or other
person than for discovery generally. ... Medical files are the subject of a spe-
cific exemption under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)
(1976). This difference in treatment reflects a recognition that information
concerning one's body has a special character. The medical information re-
quested in this case is more extensive than the mere fact of prescription drug
usage by identified patients considered in Whalen v. Roe and may be more re-
vealing of intimate details. Therefore, we hold that it falls within one of the
zones of privacy entitled to protection.
Id. at 577.
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privacy interest on the specific facts of the case."7 6 Thus, to properly
balance these competing interests, the Westinghouse court devel-
oped a seven factor test to be used in deciding whether an intrusion
into an individual's privacy is justified.77
After applying the test to the facts of the case, the court noted
that the interests in occupational safety and employee health in a"
particular plant ranked as high as other public interests previously
found to justify intrusion into information areas normally consid-
ered private.78 The court also emphasized the high need for accessi-
bility to the entire medical file of employees in order to determine
whether, and more importantly, when, employees had been sub-
jected to hazardous substances.7 9
Furthermore, the court noted that the employer had not pro-
vided any evidence indicating that the information contained in the
medical records was particularly sensitive, or that the potential in-
trusion would be especially severe to the welfare of its employees.80
Because the company conducted the testing and examination of
employee medical records with the purpose of protecting individual
employees from potential hazards, the court held that such meas-
ures would not likely deter employees from undergoing periodic
medical examinations. 81
Finally, the court considered the adequacy of the safeguards
implemented to protect the compiled medical information.8 2 Based
on the district court's observation that company procedures for pro-
tecting the records and removing names and addresses of the indi-
viduals in the compilation of data constituted sufficiently adequate
protection against non-disclosure, the Third Circuit agreed that the
employee's information had adequate protection.83 The court did not
76. Id. at 578.
77. Id. The seven factors are: the type of record requested; the information it does or
might contain; the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; the injury
from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was generated; the adequacy of safe-
guards to prevent unauthorized disclosure; the degree of need for access, and whether there is
an express statutory mandate; and articulated public policy or other recognizable public inter-
est militating toward access. See id. The court did not indicate whether all of the factors
must be met before access to private medical information can be given. It merely found that




81. See id. at 579.
82. See id. at 580.
83. See id. Specifically, the study distributed to employees and others included only ag-
gregate data. NIOSH kept the data it retained in locked cabinets in locked rooms. Material
from smaller studies was not placed on computers, and data from large studies were removed
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indicate that each of the seven factors had to be met in order to
prove that the employee's rights had been violated; rather, the
court merely found that the government satisfied each component84
Westinghouse nonetheless created a paradigm for determin-
ing when an intrusion into private medical records rises to the level
of a constitutional violation. The decision also exemplified the def-
erence given to governmental interests in such cases, even in light
of an acknowledged constitutional right to privacy.
In 1995, the Third Circuit again applied the Westinghouse
seven factor test in Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transporta-
tion Authority ("SEPTA'9.85 In SEPTA, the court held that the
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority's inadvertent
discovery and minimal disclosure of the plaintiffs medical prescrip-
tion records did not violate his constitutionally protected right to
privacy.8 6
SEPTA discovered that the plaintiff had AIDS from a phar-
macy report containing the plaintiffs name and medical prescrip-
tion information.8 7 Doe subsequently brought suit, alleging that the
discovery of his condition violated his right to privacy.88
The SEPTA court first reasoned that the limited right to pri-
vacy in personal medical records generally includes medical pre-
scription records, because people using prescription drugs legiti-
mately expect this information to remain private.89 The court then
applied the Westinghouse balancing test to determine whether the
disclosure of Doe's prescription information constituted a violation
of his constitutionally protected right to privacy.90 The court found
that the minimal intrusion upon Doe's privacy was insufficient to
from computer storage after six months. When outside contractors compiled similar data, they
were contractually bound to a policy of nondisclosure. See id.
84. See id. at 578.
85. Doe v. SEPTA, 72 F.3d 1133, 1140 (3d Cir. 1993).
86. See id. at 1134.
87. See id. at 1135-36. Although SEPTA did not routinely request patient identification
information on these reports, SEPTA's pharmacy submitted a report to SEPTA's Chief Ad-
ministrative Officer containing the names of employees who had obtained prescription medica-
tion costing more than $100 in the previous month. See id. at 1135. When the Chief Adminis-
trative Officer and Director of Benefits reviewed the pharmacy report and were unable to
identify one of Doe's prescribed medications, they contacted a SEPTA staff physician and Doe's
doctor to determine the drug's use. See id. In doing so, they discovered that Doe had AIDS.
See id.
88. See id. at 1134-35. Doe did not allege any injury other than the intrusion into his pri-
vate medical information. See id.
89. See id. at 1138.
90. See id. at 1139-40.
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require SEPTA to prove it had a compelling interest in obtaining
the information. 91
The lone dissent predicted that the court's decision would
"make it far easier in the future for employers to disclose their em-
ployee's private medical information . . . and to escape constitu-
tional liability."92 In the majority opinion, however, such reserva-
tions were insufficient to overcome the strong state interest in dis-
closure.93
In stark contrast to the Third Circuit's comprehensive explo-
ration of the constitutional zone of privacy surrounding medical re-
cords and prescription information, the Sixth Circuit, in 1995,
summarily held that the Constitution does not provide a general
right to nondisclosure of private information.94 Rather, the court
stated that "inferring very broad 'constitutional' rights where the
Constitution itself does not express them is an activity not appro-
priate to the judiciary."95 The Sixth Circuit has held that unwar-
ranted disclosure of medical information does not violate the Con-
stitution because such disclosure fails to infringe upon a "funda-
mental right," and thus the court should not be involved.96
Most recently, in 1999, the Fourth Circuit noted the conflict
over whether an individual possesses a constitutional right to pri-
vacy in medical records, but declined to definitively decide the
question.97 Implicitly adopting the Westinghouse balancing test but
failing to apply it in a constitutional context, the Ferguson v. City of
Charleston court concluded that "even if Appellants possess a con-
stitutional interest in the nondisclosure of their medical records,
that interest is outweighed by the interest of the government in
disclosure."9 8
91. See id. at 1140.
92. Id. at 1147 (Lewis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. The court stated:
We hold that a self-insured employer's need for access to employee prescription
records under its health insurance plan, when the information disclosed is only
for the purpose of monitoring the plans by those with a need to know, outweighs
an employee's interest in keeping his prescription drug records confidential.
Such minimal intrusion, although an impingement on privacy, is insufficient to
constitute a constitutional violation.
See id. at 1143
94. See Jarvis v. Welman, 52 F.3d 125, 126 (6th Cir. 1995).
95. Id. (citing J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (concerning an unau-
thorized disclosure of a prison inmate's medical records to her father, who was also an inmate
at the same prison)).
96. See id. at 126.
97. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1999).
98. Id. at 483.
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At present time, it appears that judicial formulations will
rarely, if ever, allow individual privacy interests to trump the gov-
ernment's interest in disclosure. Moreover, even if these judicial
tendencies shifted in favor of personal privacy, there are still addi-
tional limitations that would severely curtail the effectiveness of a
general constitutional protection of information privacy.
D. Fundamental Limits to the Constitutional Solution: State Actors
and the Private Medical Profession
Even if the United States Constitution were interpreted to
protect privacy rights in medical records, it would only apply to rec-
ords held by the government. 99 Despite this limitation, a recent
study reported in Harper's Magazine found that more people were
concerned about government access to private information than ac-
cess to such information by private companies. 100 This indicates
that a constitutional solution could indeed protect private informa-
tion from an entity that many people perceive as the greater threat
to their privacy.
Nonetheless, this potential solution ignores the reality that
medical care has become increasingly privatized, thus rendering a
constitutional privacy protection of medical records less potent.1 1
Thus, although the Constitution may, in fact, offer a partial solu-
99. As one commentator noted:
[T]he constitutional right to privacy does not provide reliable protection for
medical data. Whalen has never been applied to provide protection to comput-
erized health information. In addition, the constitutional right to privacy is
limited to state action; therefore, unless the government is the collector or dis-
seminator of the information, one must look elsewhere for protection of this in-
formation.
See, e.g., Carter, supra note 2, at 241 (emphasis added).
100. See Forum, The Searchable Soulk Privacy in the Age of Information Technology,
HARPER'S, Jan. 2000, at 59 [hereinafter The Searchable Soul]. Alan Westin, Professor Emeri-
tus of Public Law and Government at Columbia University, supplied this information as part
of a forum discussion reprinted in Harper's. See id. at 58. Westin was instrumental in the
passage of the Federal Privacy Act of 1974. See id.
101. "One sobering outcome of these economic reform measures has been a radical shift in
the role of the state. Where the state once assumed responsibility for providing public services
such as health, education, or transportation, the trend now is towards deregulation and priva-
tization." See Symposium, Markets and Women's International Human Rights, 25 BROOK. J.
INT'L. L. 141, 145-46 (1999). One commentator has noted how the private sector has gradually
become an increasing threat to individual privacy, gradually taking over the role of the gov-
ernment as the biggest perceived threat to such matters. See Gellman, supra note 23, at 209.
Another drawback of a constitutional solution is its remedy. When suing under a constitu-
tional theory, the best remedy available for a plaintiff is injunctive relief, which remains insuf-
ficient in many cases. See id.
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tion to the problems surrounding medical information privacy, such
a solution remains inadequate in a modern context.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT
MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY
Like the problems that plague a possible constitutional pro-
tection of private medical records, legislative and regulatory models
also are wrought with difficulties. Because federal legislation offers
protection for medical records based on the characteristics of the
entity seeking access, it provides only a fragmented and unsatisfac-
tory solution on its own. Likewise, state legislation has similar
problems, and state legislators face the additional, perhaps insur-
mountable, difficulty of not having any real impact on medical in-
formation that crosses state lines, because this information is con-
sidered interstate commerce.
A. The HHS Regulations
The issue of medical records privacy is receiving increased
legislative and regulatory attention. On October 29, 1999, President
Clinton proposed broad medical privacy regulations that controlled
access to medical information stored in an electronic medium. 102
These regulations would require doctors, hospitals, and health
plans to seek and obtain written consent from patients before re-
leasing personal information for purposes not related to payment
and treatment. 103 These regulations apply only to electronic records,
however, and do not give patients a right to sue their medical pro-
viders. 10 4 Instead, the HHS would bring lawsuits for violations of
the regulations. 105
Critics of the proposed regulations point out that law en-
forcement officials would not be required to comply with the terms
102. See Declan McCullagh, New Medical Privacy Mandate ( last modified Oct. 29, 1999)
<http://wired.comlnews/politics/0,1283,32209,00.html>. Under the Health Insurance Port-
ability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), Congress gave itself a deadline of August 21,
1999 to create confidentiality legislation or defer to HHS to develop privacy protections. After
Congress missed the deadline, President Clinton announced the proposed HHS rules, but
encouraged Congress to continue attempting to pass legislation due to the shortcomings of a
regulatory solution. See Rebecca L. Jackson, et al., Federal Legislation to Protect Patient Con-
fidentiality not Expected Before Fall, 7 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 15 (Aug. 1999); President Wil-
liam J. Clinton, Remarks on medical privacy, Nov. 1, 1999, in M2 Presswire, available in 1999
WL 24365495.
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of the regulations, and the regulations do not restrict the activities
of lawyers, auditors, or consultants who come in contact with pri-
vate medical information. 0 6 Furthermore, some free market groups
argue that the complex proposal is "too regulatory," fearing that the
cost of medical insurance could increase because of the additional
red tape. 0 7 Still other critics express dissatisfaction with the pro-
posed rules because they claim that President Clinton has over-
stepped the bounds of his constitutional authority in regulating an
issue that is better left to Congress. 08 Finally, some observers criti-
cize the regulations themselves. When HHS Secretary Donna Sha-
lala described her attempt to "balance the protection of privacy with
our public responsibility to support national priorities," skeptics
noted that this process was significantly less stringent than the
"compelling public interest" test typically employed in the judicial
context. 09 According to one commentator, the regulations essen-
tially grant law enforcement officials unlimited access to examine
anyone's medical records without sufficiently limiting their access
or dissemination of the information. 110 From this perspective, the
proposed regulations contain the same problems that plague the
constitutional solution-too much deference to the government's
interest in disclosure.
Significantly, the proposed regulations failed to impress those
upon whom they would have the greatest effect, namely doctors and
insurance companies. A recent article outlined the dissatisfaction of
both groups."' Doctors were unhappy with a provision allowing
managed care plans to use personal information without consent if
the purpose was "healthcare operations."112 This language, physi-
cians argued, constituted a loophole through which HMOs and
other insurers could pry into the doctor-patient relationship under
the guise of assessing the quality of care. 113 Similarly, insurers
106. See Shailagh Murray, Clinton to Propose Regulations Today to Protect Privacy of
Medical Records, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1999, at A4.
107. McCullagh, supra note 102.
108. See Michael Posner, Blocking the Presidential Power Play, NATL. L.J., Jan. 1, 2000
C'Presidents have broad authority under the Constitution to issue orders to run the executive
branch, but... others contend that Presidents since Theodore Roosevelt-especially Clinton-
have stretched, if not abused, their powers by taking over the authority of Congress to legis-
late.").
109. SYKES, supra note 3, at 116-17.
110. See id. at 117 ("Indeed, [Shalala's] proposal would have made it easier for investiga-
tors to get someone's medical records than to get records about their movie rentals or cable
television habits-all protected by federal law.").





pointed to a provision holding them liable for privacy breaches by
"business partners" such as lawyers and accountants, arguing that
the rules would make them too vulnerable to lawsuits.114
In addition, both physicians and insurers agreed that privacy
protections would drive up the cost of health care by more than $3.5
billion over the next five years. 115 Both groups also complained
about the increased level of federal scrutiny required by the new
rules' enforcement provisions. 116
Because of the widespread criticism of the regulations and
the practical difficulties that would arise in implementing them,
they appear to be, at best, a temporary solution that will remain in
place until a better measure of protection can be implemented.
B. The Privacy Act of 1974
In addition to the regulations imposed by HHS and President
Clinton, a number of other federal legislative solutions have existed
in various forms since 1974. The Privacy Act of 1974 attempts to
ensure that "the government will use fair information practices
with regard to the collection, use and dissemination of individually-
identifiable records."117 The Act mandates that government agen-
cies not disclose "any record" that exists within a "system of rec-
ords" controlled by a government agency."l 8 When agencies do col-
lect data, they must notify the individual that data is being col-
lected and the reason for its collection."19
The Privacy Act allows for civil remedies, and, in some cases,
criminal penalties, if a disclosure is made in willful contravention
of the Act. 20 The chief limitation on the effectiveness of the Privacy




117. Carter, supra note 2, at 241 (citing The Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, §1, 88
Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §552a (1994)). Carter notes that the Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act amended the Privacy Act in 1988. The Computer
Matching and Privacy Protection Act regulates the "matching" of files by using an individual's
personal identifier, such as a social security number. See id. at n.96 (citing Pub. L. No. 100-
503, 102 Stat. 2507 (amending 5 U.S.C. §552a (note)).
118. Id. at 242.
119. See id.
120. See id. (citing 5 U.S.C §552, which provides that employers or officers who willfully
disclose confidential information to any person or agency not entitled to receive such informa-
tion will be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a maximum fine of $5000).
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impact. 121 For instance, no patient consent to disclosure is neces-
sary if an agency decides to make disclosure for "routine uses," rea-
sons "compatible with the uses for which the data was collected." 122
Still further, the Act provides no protection for privately held in-
formation. 123
C. The Freedom of Information Act
The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") 124 requires that "in-
formation held by executive branch agencies be made available on
request to the general public," subject to exemptions which "may
allow a government agency to withhold medical information re-
quested under FOIA."125 Moreover, information that must be dis-
closed under FOIA is not protected by the Privacy Act, thus further
limiting the Act's effectiveness. 126
In summary, although existing and proposed federal legisla-
tion may provide comprehensive protection of records held by gov-
ernment entities, it covers very little else. Like the aforementioned
various constitutional solutions, the federal regulatory responses
impose virtually no restrictions on what private healthcare provid-
ers may disclose to third parties. Moreover, rules that do protect
privately held information, like the HHS regulations, are seriously
limited in other ways, as, for example, the existing battle over
whether federal legislation might actually erode protection of pri-
vate medical records by preempting tougher state laws demon-
strates. 127 As discussed below, similar defects plague state attempts
at privacy legislation.
121. See id. at 242-43.
122. Id. at 243.
123. See id. The net result of the Privacy Act is, then, that, while federally operated hospi-
tals and private healthcare facilities under contract with the federal government are covered
by the Privacy Act, other institutions-such as those that are exclusively private-are not.
124. 5 U.S.C. §552 (1994).
125. Carter, supra note 2, at 244. Exemption six of the FOIA "pertains to 'personnel and
medical files... the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.' " Id. This exemption operates to "prevent disclosure of individually-
identifiable medical information, unless there is a public interest which outweighs the privacy
interest in nondisclosure." Id.
126. See id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)).
127. See supra Part HI.A. An additional fear about federal legislation is that it would pre-
empt more restrictive state laws. As a long-term strategy, however, state-by-state regulation
of privacy is not compatible with modern methods of healthcare delivery. See Lawrence 0.
Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451, 516 (1995). Nevertheless, at
least one commentator recommends maintaining state protections until a federal solution can




D. State Attempts at Privacy Regulation
Traditionally, health care has been subject to state regula-
tion.128 Several states provide constitutional protections for individ-
ual privacy interests.129 Like the Federal Constitution, however,
state constitutional protections are inherently weak in that they
protect only against invasions of privacy by state actors. 30 In addi-
tion, state constitutions offer no satisfactory remedies unless "the
state fails to assert any significant interest or is particularly care-
less in disclosing highly sensitive information." 18 1
Protection of individual privacy may also be achieved under
state common law. 18 2 Tort actions for privacy invasions or suits
based on an implied contract between doctor and patient are possi-
ble remedies in some cases. 183 Critics argue that tort remedies are
not useful for individuals, however, because the relief available
"will not meet the broad objectives of the code of fair information
practices."'18 4 For example, privacy tort law provides no liability for
the use of public record information, and common law extension of
this rule by judges remains unlikely since tort directives are statu-
tory in nature and many judges are reluctant to enter into this area
of judicial decision-making. 135 State common law protections are
weak because they are often ineffective in cases involving medical
records since the majority of medical records travel in interstate
commerce. As such, these records become subject to federal-not
state-regulation. In addition, many states do not recognize the
128. See Carter, supra note 2, at 245.
129. See id. at 246 & n.131. These states include Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina, and Washington. See id.
130. See id. Carter points out a provision in the California Constitution that extends the
state constitutional right to privacy to private entities in addition to the government, but this
is a rare exception. See id. at 254.
131. Id. at 246-47 (quoting Gostin, supra note 127, at 498 & n.211).
132. See id. at 247.
133. See id. at 248. Carter notes the argument for implied contract as one where:
"[a]ny time a doctor undertakes the treatment of a patient, and the consensual
relationship of physician and patient is established, two jural obligations ...
are simultaneously assumed by the doctor. Doctor and patient enter into a
simple contract .... As an implied condition of that contract ... the doctor
warrants that any confidential information gained through the relationship will
not be released without the patienfs permission."
Id. at 248-49 (quoting Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801
(N.D. Ohio 1965)). Defamation suits may be brought in some states "if medical data
containing inaccurate information are disclosed to an unauthorized person, and if
the subject's reputation is adversely affected." Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
134. Gelman, supra note 23, at 210.
135. See id. at 211.
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above-mentioned tort privacy causes of action. 13 6 Consequently,
numerous states have enacted legislation to fill the gap left by in-
sufficient state common law protections.187
Privacy legislation exists in every state that requires some
level of reporting of patient information to public health or law en-
forcement agencies. 13 8 Similarly, most states recognize that infor-
mation shared between patient and physician is privileged, al-
though at least one critic has argued that this privilege protects
only against disclosure of confidential medical information in judi-
cial proceedings.139
Like any legislation, there are limits to the effectiveness of
state laws governing the privacy of medical records. For example,
some states protect only medical information related to certain sen-
sitive diseases, such as HIV or mental illness. 14° In addition, state
legislation typically conditions privacy protection on the party
holding the information, and not on the type of information held.'4 '
Some of the more comprehensive statutes, such as one in New York,
136. Carter argues:
Under one or a combination of these tort causes of action, a patient may recover
damages for the improper release of confidential medical information. How-
ever, as noted, these claims are often ineffective in medical records cases, and
the causes of action are not recognized in all states. As a result, many states
have passed legislation to address some of these confidentiality issues.
Carter, supra note 2, at 249
137. See id. at 249-50. According to Carter, about 20% of the states have such legislation.
See id. Many of these statutes are based on the Federal Privacy Act of 1974, see supra note
117, and provide a degree of assurance that medical data held by the state will not be dis-
closed to third parties without the patients consent. See UNIF. HEALTH CARE INFORMATION
ACT, prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 475-76 (1998) (citing data practices statutes from eight states as
examples); see also Harris, supra note 3, at 1212-13 (noting that Arizona, California, Montana,
and Rhode Island have also enacted comprehensive legislation to protect healthcare informa-
tion).
138. See UNIF. HEALTH CARE INFORMATION ACT, prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 475-76 (1998).
Note that, if information is passed on to state agencies such as public health or law enforce-
ment agencies, a constitutionally recognized protection of privacy would prevent disclosure
from these agencies to third parties.
139. See UNIF. HEALTH CARE INFORMATION ACT, prefatory note, 9 U.L.A. 475-76 (1998).
This provision exists only if it is decreed by statutes, since there was no physician-patient
privilege at common law. See id.; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2157 (1986 & Supp. 1998)
C'[A] person duly authorized to practice medicine or surgery shall not disclose any information
that the person has acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, if the informa-
tion was necessary to enable the person to [treat] the patient as a physician.... ").
140. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-584 (West 1997); IDAHO CODE §39-610 (1998).
141. See Carter, supra note 2, at 251 (footnote omitted).
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impose a duty of confidentiality on non-provider parties 142 like in-
surance companies. 143
The most restrictive limitation of state legislation is lack of
consistency among states.1M When medical information travels be-
tween states, as is often the case with Internet, telephone, or fac-
simile transportation of information, no state law will protect the
confidentiality of that information. 145 State protections, therefore,
no matter how stringent, will not protect the privacy of medical rec-
ords transferred over the Internet.
IV. SELF-REGULATION: A MATTER OF INCENTIVE
With the rapid growth of the Internet and the absence of
other effective means of protection, many companies have imple-
mented their own privacy policies in order to protect their clients'
142. For purposes of this Note, "non-provider" parties refers to parties other than the en-
tity providing healthcare. Examples of non-provider parties include insurance companies and
research facilities.
143. See Carter, supra note 2, at 251 (citing Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Legislative Survey
of State Confidentiality Laws, with Specific Emphasis on HIrV and Immunization, pt. 4, § II.A.
(Feb. 1997)).
144. See id. at 253-65 (summarizing the legislation in effect in California, Tennessee, and
Minnesota); see also Glenn R. Simpson, E-Commerce Firms Start to Rethink Opposition to
Privacy Regulation as Abuses, Anger Rise, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2000, at A24 (noting that
pending legislation exists in California to prohibit Internet service providers from disclosing
personal information without customer permission and to create an office of the 'Privacy Om-
budsman" to investigate the unlawful release of personal information by commercial or gov-
ernmental entities and to allow civil suits for unlawful release of personal information). In
addition, pending legislation in New York would establish an opt out system for unsolicited
marketing, restrict collection, disclosure, and dissemination of personal information, and en-
act a telecommunications privacy law regulating the collection, use, or disclosure of informa-
tion by telecommunications carriers. See id. (citation omitted).
145. See id. at 265; see also ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999) (quot-
ing American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (agreeing
that "f[the unique nature of the Internet highlights the likelihood that a single actor might be
subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent regulation by states that
the actor never intended to reach and possibly was unaware were being accessed. Typically,
states' jurisdictional limits are related to geography; geography, however is a virtually mean-
ingless construct on the Internet."). The ACLU v. Johnson court also supported the notion
that there is no such thing as intrastate commerce over the Internet since Internet speech is
available in any location and that state laws regulating the Internet "cannot effectively be
limited to purely intrastate communications over the Internet because no such communica-
tions exist." Id. (quoting Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171 (emphasis added)); see also United States
v. Whiting, 165 F.3d 631, 634 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that the downloading of Internet images
onto a personal computer requires the use of interstate commerce); United States v. Simpson,
152 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting the use of interstate commerce in transferring
files via the Internet).
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and customers' interests. 14 Self-regulation, though, is not limited to
Internet transactions. The securities industry, for example, has
regulated itself on-line as well as on paper. 47 Many advocates ar-
gue that such a scheme would best protect electronically stored
medical information. 48 Indeed, President Clinton's top Internet ad-
viser, Ira Magaziner, observed in 1998 that "private industry must
respond to growing public concerns about issues such as privacy in
the digital age and that businesses and consumer groups must work
together to develop industry standards that protect privacy."149
Similarly, Lori Fena, chairwoman of the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation, noted that self-regulation is most effective when accompa-
nied by "a huge threat of legislation" as well as by marketplace in-
centives. 50
Moreover, since medical records have economic value, mem-
bers of the business community fear that stringent legislation
might stifle legitimate e-commerce. 151 One author suggests that the
creation of successful and enforceable fair information practices
may be a matter of establishing effective and appropriate incen-
tives. 152 In the past, policies implementing the principles of infor-
mation privacy have not included the types of incentives necessary
146. Other attempts to control access to private medical information have resulted in
small-scale attempts by those in the medical services industry to police themselves when
transmitting medical information electronically. See Ann Carrns, Intel and AMA Form Serv-
ice to Improve Security of Online Medical Information, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1999, at B6.
147. See generally DAVID P. McCAFFREY & DAVID W. HART, WALL STREET POLICES ITSELF
(1998) (providing an overview of the self-regulatory mechanisms at work in the securities
industry-under the federal securities laws, the national securities exchanges, registered secu-
rities associations, registered clearing agencies and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board have the power to create rules, with the SECs approval, that encourage fair, ethical,
and efficient practices in the securities industry).
148. See White House's Magaziner advises Internet self-regulation, The Freedom Forum
Online (last modified Jan. 13, 1998), <http:ll freefomforum.org/technology/1998/1/13magazi-
ner.asp>.
149. Id.
150. Self-Regulation Needed to Ensure Privacy, TechWeb (last modified Mar. 13, 1998),
<http:www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB19980313SO018>. For a discussion of marketplace
incentives, see infra Part IV.A.
151. See Steve Zurier, Privacy Sound Off- Regulation vs. Self-Regulation (last modified
Sept. 21, 1998), <http://www.internetwk.com/trends/trends092198.htm> ("[Self-regulation]
mean[s] letting the private sector lead the way in making online transactions secure so that e-
commerce can be conducted safely, and offering consumers options so that their confidence in
online commerce can be won and maintained.").
152. See Gellman, supra note 23, at 213 ('Privacy principles have generally not been im-
plemented in ways that offer natural incentives to record keepers to comply. Few existing
legal devices have proved effective in pressuring record keepers to take affirmative steps to
meet privacy objectives. If adequate pressure or interest exists, any of the devices might
work.").
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to induce record keepers to comply.158 As a result, existing legal de-
vices are ineffective in pressuring record keepers to take affirma-
tive steps to meet privacy objectives. 154 If adequate incentives are
applied, however, any of the devices may work. 155 One such incen-
tive may be marketplace competition; another might be the threat
of tough federal legislation and enforcement.
A. The Marketplace Incentive
According to one commentator, the marketplace is the most
powerful incentive for regulating business on-line: "Self-regulation
works according to the law of customer satisfaction. Without this
satisfaction, there can be no consumer confidence, no online trans-
actions and certainly no thriving Internet marketplace, as exists
today."156
One way to create such an incentive may be to create specific
privacy codes that could be jointly adopted by merchants and con-
sumers and enforced through private mechanisms. 157 But for this to
work, merchants and consumers must provide adequate interest in
enforcement mechanisms. 158
The effect that marketplace incentive has on companies that
maintain private information in electronic storage is already clear
in a few instances. For example, when America Online saw its stock
price drop after announcing it planned to sell user information, the
153. See id.
154. Some legal scholars argue that privacy matters are not for the judiciary or legislature
to decide. One commentator has stated that privacy matters "concern decisions that should
not be made by any governmental body or official, but should be left to individuals." See
Strossen, The Right to Be Let Alone: Constitutional Privacy in Griswold, Roe and Bowers, in
BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 90 (Terry
Eastland ed., 1995). But for individual decisions to have any ascertainable effect on medical
records privacy, the level of interest among individuals must be high. See id.
155. See id.
156. H. Robert Wientzen, Privacy Sound Off- Self Regulation (last modified Sept. 21,
1998), <http://www.internetwk.com/trends/trends092198-2.htm>. One way to implement such
a model is to post privacy policies and let customers decide whether to use a particular storage
format, health care provider or insurance company based on what kind of access will be avail-
able. This would be possible for records stored on paper as well, but this option is weakened
by the fact that, under many managed care programs, patients do not have much choice of who
their healthcare or insurance providers will be. Still, companies do have this choice, and ar-
guably have more influence on the marketplace than individuals, thus potentially making the
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company quickly abandoned the idea. 159 Similarly, when asked how
best to protect electronically stored private information, Alan
Westin, Professor Emeritus at Columbia University and key player
in the passage of the Privacy Act of 1974, responded that the best
way to protect against the unwarranted release of private informa-
tion is,
[b]y the perception of the marketplace and because of the privacy advocates' vigi-
lance. When a [banking] conglomerate ...was formed, they issued a privacy
promise, which they registered with the federal regulators as well as posted on
their Web site, that said: 'e will never use health information from our [health
insurance] subsidiary for any situation that has to do with banking or financing."
Now, why did they do that? They did it as self-denial, they would have loved to put
that information together. They did it because of the perception that they would
not have happy customers if they used people's health information that way. 16o
Several companies, weary of waiting for federal legislation to
take over, have already implemented their own privacy
strategies. 161 For instance, Intel and the American Medical Associa-
tion announced in October 1999 that they would offer an on-line
service to provide a means to "authenticate the identity of doctors
seeking to access and transmit health data in cyberspace ....
Boosting security is seen as key to the widespread adoption of
Internet based medical transactions, which have the potential to
reduce paperwork and cut costs." 162 The marketplace incentives
could provide additional protection for medical records privacy, but
not without stronger consumer interest and awareness of the pri-
vacy issue.
B. The Threat of Federal Regulation as an Incentive to Self-Regulate
As noted above, other industries have implemented a self-
regulatory regime with a considerable degree of success. 163 Two
commentators note that the term "self-regulation" understates how
much its effectiveness depends on government agencies and the in-
159. See Self-Regulation Needed To Ensure Privacy, TechWeb (last modified Mar, 13,
1998), <http:www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB19980313SO018>.
160. The Searchable Soul, supra note 100, at 66. Ron Sege, executive vice president of Ly-
cos, noted that the reason for privacy policies on the Internet, including the Lycos privacy
policy, is "[b]ecause I believe it will maximize the value of the firm over the long term. And if
I start selling this information, then customers are going to go someplace else." Id.
161. See Carrns, supra note 146; HP Calls for Self-Regulation to Address Online Privacy
(last modified June 23, 1998), <http://www.hp.com/latinamerica/mpg/htmllprivacy.html>.
162. Carrns, supra note 146, at B6.
163. See generally MCCAFFREY & HART, supra note 147, at 6-8, 176-87 (defining self-
regulation and discussing its usefulness in various industries).
1631
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
fluence of other disciplinary bodies. 164 Similarly, "[s]elf-regulatory
organizations and firms have room to design regulatory systems
rather than having to implement rules designed largely by the gov-
ernment, and the right to largely control themselves is theirs to
lose."165
In a survey of the self-regulatory efforts of the securities in-
dustry, commentators looked at several case studies involving at-
tempts at self-regulation in other industries. 166 One study of the
operations of pharmaceutical companies reported that internal
quality control resulted in collection of better information about
cooperation with company policy than external regulations. 167 This
resulted in more effective detection of problems. 168 Specifically, the
self-regulating systems proved more effective than government
regulation where the threat of liability, bad press, or the potential
for Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") actions existed. These
external pressures helped convince top level management to comply
with the self-policing rules. 169
The authors of the survey argue that self-regulation is most
effective when it exists alongside the threat of external
regulation. 70 They stress that neither public nor private systems of
regulation are intrinsically superior.17' Instead, they point out that
the notion that government regulation is more stringent than pri-
vate regulation (and thus should serve as a baseline to measure
private regulation's performance) oversimplifies the issue. 172 The
distinct advantage of public regulation, they argue, is that it is
relatively independent of the advocates of production and therefore
less likely to be excessively permissive. 173 This remoteness, how-
ever, leaves public regulators less informed and often unable to
handle situations effectively. 174 In comparison, private regulators,
such as internal quality control programs and specially trained
staffs who exist to ensure compliance, are better informed and more
164. See id. at 7.
165. Id.
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adaptable, but they may not be self-sufficient. 175 Thus, both private
and public regulatory bodies are necessary to make self-regulation
most effective.
C. Problems with Self-Regulation
The concept of self-regulation as the best means of protecting
the privacy of electronically stored personal information is not
without its critics. In 1997, the Federal Trade Commission agreed
to a self-regulation plan offered by 14 data collection agencies,
which together account for roughly 90% of the personal information
retrieval business. 17 6 Since its inception, however, the mechanics of
this program have raised doubts among privacy advocates. 177 For
example, the plan requires individuals to opt out of databases by
actively requesting that third parties receive limited access to per-
sonal information. 178 Critics argue that "[in]any people don't even
know that these entities exist," and that such restrictions are only
"cosmetic."179 As criticism has mounted, the electronic-commerce
industry has softened its opposition to federal regulation of Internet
privacy issues. 180 One past advocate of self-regulation even observed
that "[s]ome in the industry are mulling whether we're not better
off working at a federal level to create some standards."1'8 Although
proponents of self-regulation have argued that new legal restric-
tions could hinder the commercial growth of the Internet,182 multi-
plying reports of surreptitious collection of consumer data by Inter-
net marketers and questionable distribution of such personal data
by other companies make privacy an issue of increasing public con-
cern. 183
In the 2000 presidential primaries, both Vice President Al-
bert Gore and Republican Steve Forbes jumped on the issue. 184
175. See id. McCaffrey and Hart point out that external regulation, private legal action
and political and economic pressures often produce undesirable outcomes such as waste, but
self-regulation does not work effectively without them. See id. at 184.









184. See id. For example, Steve Forbes said in a speech to the Free Congress Foundation
that "[p]rivacy is the basis for a free society .... The biggest and most serious threat to our
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Meanwhile, lawmakers from both parties are calling for safeguards
such as requiring companies to disclose how they collect data and
use personal information, and to obtain consumer permission before
they resell the data. 8 5 Other executives continue to look to the
market as the primary solution to the problem but remain prepared
to work with Congress if self-regulation does not prove a workable
model for protecting medical records privacy. 186
V. CONCLUSION
Despite these legitimate concerns, many legal scholars insist
that personal information privacy is an area "where Internet self-
regulation works best." 87 For example, according to Michael Moy-
nihan, former member of the Treasury and Commerce Departments
and principal architect of the Clinton Administration's Internet
regulation policy, it is overly optimistic and unrealistic to believe in
the government's ability to solve the problem of Internet privacy
invasions. 88 "Even if legislation is passed to deal with the most
problematic areas, health records, for example, the underlying
trend is for information to become more and more accessible. Gov-
ernment won't deal with that."'1 9 Even if it does, there are limits as
to what records and what record keepers the government can regu-
late.
Similarly, the National Research Council warns that medical
records are especially vulnerable to abuse since "there are no strong
incentives to safeguard patient information because patients, in-
dustry groups and government regulators aren't demanding protec-
tion."190
This 'lack of incentive remains perhaps the biggest limit on
self-regulation. According to Bill Hogan of the Center for Public In-
tegrity, "[t]here is no real money constituency in favor of privacy,
privacy comes from a massive federal government seeking information it does not need, nor a
constitutional right to have." Godfrey, supra note 52, at A8.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. PRESTON R. PADDEN, CYBERLIABILITY, 582 PLI/Pat 7, *9 (1999) (on file with author).
188. See The Searchable Soul, supra note 100, at 64.
189. Id. In his final State of the Union Address, President Clinton addressed this problem
by noting the recent regulations, but qualifying them with the statement that achieving com-
promise in Congress will be difficult in this era of third-party payers and external review of
medical decision-making. See Rick Green & Andrew Julian, State of the Union, HARTFORD
COURANT, Jan. 28, 2000, at A14, available in 2000 WL 4224778.
190. SYKES, supra note 3, at 118.
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and there is a lot of money in favor of invading it."'191 Still, despite
these concerns, self-regulation remains far from a futile proposi-
tion. If sufficient interest, incentives and enforcement mechanisms
can come to fruition, then a functioning marketplace and the threat
of restrictive governmental intervention could spur the creation of
satisfactory modes of protecting medical records privacy. Free from
the problems of other modes of regulation, self-regulation is worth
the effort it will take.
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191. Id. at 119.
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